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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-4541 
 ___________ 
 
 ROBERT F. MCHALE; DELILAH A. MCHALE, 
    Appellants 
 
v. 
 
RALPH J. KELLY 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-01363) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 14, 2013 
 
 Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 30, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Robert and Delilah McHale, husband and wife, appeal pro se from the order of the 
District Court dismissing their complaint.  We will affirm.   
I. 
 This civil action is the second that the McHales have brought against Ralph J. Kelly, 
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Esq., an attorney who represented them in a personal injury matter.  Disposition of this appeal 
requires some discussion of the background of the McHales’ prior suit, and we assume for 
present purposes only that the McHales’ factual allegations are true. 
 In 1999, Robert McHale was injured in an automobile accident in New York state.  The 
McHales retained Kelly, who filed a personal injury action on their behalf in New York in 
2001.  Kelly also advised them to pursue an uninsured motorist claim in Pennsylvania.  The 
McHales resisted but, on Kelly’s advice, eventually agreed and obtained a settlement of 
$750,000 in 2004.  According to the McHales, Kelly misrepresented his expertise in workers 
compensation matters and this settlement reduced Robert McHale’s workers compensation 
medical coverage.  When the McHales confronted Kelly about that issue, he offered them a 
settlement of approximately $22,000.  The McHales accepted it and signed a full release in 
2004.  In 2006, the McHales met with a New York attorney, who took over their representation 
in the New York action and told them that (1) Kelly’s advice to pursue the uninsured motorist 
claim was erroneous because it could not increase their ultimate award, and (2) one of the 
defendants in the New York action had been dismissed because Kelly served the wrong 
corporate entity.  The New York action apparently remains pending. 
 The McHales filed their first action pro se against Kelly in 2011 (D.N.J. Civ. No. 11-cv-
00143), alleging that he committed malpractice in connection with the uninsured motorist 
claim, Robert McHale’s workers compensation coverage, and the New York action.  On 
Kelly’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the District Court determined that Pennsylvania’s 
two-year statute of limitations applied and dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations 
grounds on October 14, 2011.  
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 The McHales then sent the District Court a letter dated October 18, 2011, in which they 
took issue with certain of the court’s rulings and requested leave to file an amended complaint 
on the basis of discovery provided by Kelly shortly before the dismissal order.  The McHales 
later submitted another letter along with a proposed amended complaint asserting claims for 
fraud, “aggravated negligence,” and breach of fiduciary duty on the ground that Kelly’s 
discovery responses revealed that he knew about but did not disclose his mistakes at the time 
he and the McHales entered into the 2004 settlement and release.  By letter dated December 9, 
2011 (which is docketed as a “letter order”), the District Court advised them that these later 
filings “have no legal effect” because “there is no pending action in this court at this time and 
no valid complaint to amend.”  The District Court did not specifically address the McHales’ 
letter of October 18, but its December 9 letter order left no doubt that it considered the action 
concluded.  The McHales did not appeal from either the District Court’s order of dismissal or 
its December 9 letter order. 
 Instead, they filed pro se the separate civil action at issue here.  Their complaint asserts 
the three claims they sought to assert in their proposed amended complaint in their first action, 
and the underlying allegations are materially identical.  Kelly filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss on the basis of res judicata, which the District Court granted.  The District Court 
agreed that the McHales’ claim for fraud is barred by res judicata, but it again concluded that 
their other claims are governed by Pennsylvania law and dismissed them on statute of 
limitations grounds.  The McHales appeal pro se.
1
 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  
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II. 
 Most of the McHales’ arguments on appeal are addressed to the dismissal of their first 
action.  They argue, for example, that the District Court erred in that action by applying 
Pennsylvania instead of New Jersey law and by denying leave to file an amended complaint.  
We lack jurisdiction to review the dismissal of the McHales’ first action, however, because 
they did not appeal and the jurisdictional period for doing so has expired.  See Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).  The McHales argue that they did not file an appeal in their 
first action only because they thought that the District Court would permit an amended 
complaint, but the District Court did nothing to mislead them in that regard and, even if it had, 
we have “no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.”  Id. 
 The fact that the McHales did not appeal the dismissal of their first action means that 
the judgment in that action is final for res judicata purposes.  The District Court concluded that 
it was bound to apply New Jersey’s law of res judicata under Semtek International Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2011), and that New Jersey law bars the McHales’ 
fraud claim, but it declined to dismiss their other two claims on that basis.  Kelly argues that 
Semtek does not apply because the preclusive effect of a federal diversity judgment on a 
second federal diversity action is a matter of federal law, see Paramount Aviation Corp. v. 
Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1999), and that we should affirm on the alternative 
ground that federal law bars the McHales’ complaint as a whole.  We need not decide whether 
                                                                                                                                                                       
See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).  The McHales argue that the 
District Court erroneously converted Kelly’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary 
judgment, but the District Court properly treated it as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  The McHales also argue 
that the District Court misapplied New Jersey state pleading standards, but those standards do not 
govern in federal court and the court’s ruling did not turn on the pleading standard in any event. 
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Semtek or Paramount Aviation controls in this situation generally because we agree that the 
McHales’ second action is barred under the circumstances presented here. 
 “Both New Jersey and federal law apply res judicata or claim preclusion when three 
circumstances are present: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the 
same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”  In re 
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).  Each of these 
elements is present here.  First, we need not decide whether a federal dismissal on statute of 
limitations grounds constitutes a judgment “on the merits” under New Jersey law2 because, 
even under Semtek, such a dismissal constitutes a judgment on the merits as to subsequent 
complaints filed in the same federal court.  See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506.  Second, the parties 
are identical.  Finally, under both federal and New Jersey law, the McHales’ second complaint 
was based on the same “cause of action” as their first because there is an “essential similarity 
of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.”  Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon 
Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 965 (noting 
that New Jersey law is the same).  Res judicata “bars not only claims that were brought in a 
previous action, but also claims that could have been brought,” Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225, 
and the McHales’ claims in this action clearly qualify.   
 Indeed, the McHales did attempt to bring those claims in their first action, but the 
District Court did not permit them to do so.  The McHales take issue with that decision, but 
                                                 
2
 The District Court concluded that it does, though it considered the issue “a close question.”  (D. Ct. 
Op. at 8) (citing Walker v. Choudhary, 40 A.3d 63, 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012)).  The 
McHales have provided no reason to question that conclusion, but we need not and do not decide the 
issue. 
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even if the District Court erred (which we lack jurisdiction to decide) its error would not render 
its decision any less a final judgment on the merits.  See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 
452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Velasquez v. Franz, 589 A.2d 143, 150 (N.J. 1991).  The McHales’ 
remedy for any such error was to file an appeal, not a separate civil action.  See Moitie, 452 
U.S. at 398 (“A judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the law is 
not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a direct review and not by bringing 
another action upon the same cause of action.”) (quotation mark and alteration omitted); 
Velasquez, 589 A.2d at 512 (“If the federal court misinterpreted which choice of law rule to 
use, as plaintiff . . . allege[s], correcting that mistake is not a job for a state court [in a 
subsequent action] but must be addressed to the third circuit.”). 
 The McHales blame their failure to appeal on the District Court but, as explained above, 
the District Court did nothing to lead them to believe that they would be permitted to file an 
amended complaint.  And even if it had, there generally is no equitable exception to the 
operation of res judicata when a party fails to file an appeal.  See Moitie, 452 U.S. at 400-01.  
The McHales could have appealed from the District Court’s order dismissing their complaint 
in their first action, or from the District Court’s letter order of December 9, 2011, which 
declined to take action on the McHales’ most recent post-judgment filings and made clear the 
District Court’s determination that the matter was concluded.  The McHales decided instead to 
institute this second civil action, which is barred by the final judgment entered in their first.  
The McHales’ pro se status does not relieve them of the consequences of that procedural 
misstep.  See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 Our conclusion that the McHales’ complaint as a whole is barred by res judicata 
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ordinarily would render it unnecessary to review the District Court’s ruling that their second 
and third claims are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations (which Kelly also defends).  
We have jurisdiction to review that ruling, however, and we will exercise it for the reasons 
explained in the margin.
3
   
 Having done so, we perceive no error.  The District Court concluded that the McHales’ 
second claim is merely a reassertion of the malpractice claim they asserted in their first action 
and that it is barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524, for the 
reasons it previously explained.  The District Court also held that the McHales’ third claim is 
barred for similar reasons.  The McHales do not dispute that their claims are untimely under 
Pennsylvania law.  Instead, they argue that the District Court should have applied New Jersey’s 
six-year statute of limitations, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1, which would make their claims 
timely.   
 In concluding otherwise, the District Court properly applied the “most significant 
relationship” test that New Jersey has adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws.  See Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp., 709 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2013); see 
also Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 48 A.3d 1041, 1047 (N.J. 2012) (applying “most 
significant relationship” test to statutes of limitations).  The District Court also properly 
concluded that the relevant contacts, considered qualitatively, point to the application of 
Pennsylvania law.  See Maniscalco, 709 F.3d at 207.  The McHales are domiciled in New 
Jersey, and New York is where the automobile accident occurred and where Kelly filed suit.  
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 The McHale’s appeal from the District Court’s ruling in this case also gives us jurisdiction to review 
the legal issues that formed the basis of the first action and thereby effectively resolves any lingering 
issues in both cases. 
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All of the other relevant contacts, however, are with Pennsylvania:  Kelly is domiciled in 
Pennsylvania and practiced law through a Pennsylvania law firm; he initiated the uninsured 
motorist action in Pennsylvania; he negotiated the McHales’ settlement in Pennsylvania and 
the settlement agreement is governed by Pennsylvania law; and the insurance policy providing 
the lion’s share of that settlement was issued in Pennsylvania.  For the reasons explained in 
more detail by the District Court, we agree that these contacts give Pennsylvania the most 
significant relationship with this suit and that the McHales’ second and third claims are 
untimely under Pennsylvania law. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
